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Abstract
From the outset of the post-Mao reform, the central government has made genuine efforts to 
adapt the grassroots government system in the urban areas to social changes brought about 
by the reform in the urban neighborhoods, such as the drastic decline of the role of work 
units and the rapid increase in private ownership of residential properties. This system was 
anchored by its self-governing body, Residents’ Committee (RCs, jumin weiyuanhui). Resi-
dents’ Committees were first established by the government in the 1950s. Before the post-Mao 
reform, the central government used RCs to assist work units at the grassroots level in imple-
menting Party and government policies, monitoring and controlling the population, and pro-
viding residents with some basic social welfare services. Moreover, the central government 
treated the RCs as its administrative extensions, in conjunction with work units, at the local 
level.
Introduction
Before reform, urban residents relied more 
on their work units than on the RCs for their 
basic life needs. Therefore, the RCs “were seen 
to be performing trivial and routine tasks”1. 
However, since the outset of the Post-Mao 
reform, the importance of the work units in 
meeting the residents’ basic life needs de-
clined. More importantly, most work units 
no longer provided the social services, such 
as housing, childcare, medical care and other 
social welfare services, which they did in the 
pre-reform era. And many urban residents do 
not belong to any work unit at all (e.g., those 
who are laid off from the work units and those 
who are employed in the private or foreign or 
joint-venture enterprises). It is in this larger 
1 R. Benewick, I. Tong, and J. Howell, Self-Gover-
nance and Community: A Preliminary Compari-
son between Villagers’ Committees and Urban 
Community Councils, China Information: A Jour-
nal on Contemporary China Studies 18 (2004), 
p. 14.
context that the Chinese government initiated 
the revitalization of RCs.
In 2000, the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued 
its decree, “Views for Advancing the Construc-
tion of Urban Residential Communities,” which 
marked the beginning of the central govern-
ment’s push for more autonomy of grassroots 
governing bodies in urban China. The decree 
called for the establishment of new grassroots 
governing bodies, Community Residents’ 
Committees (CRCs), which are supposed to be 
different from old RCs. The CRCs tend to have 
more residents and more autonomy than old 
RCs. In 2008 when my survey in five Chinese 
cities (Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Cheng-
du, and Hangzhou) was conducted, most of 
these five cities’ RCs had already been trans-
formed into the CRCs. According to the same 
decree, the CRCs should operate based on the 
four democratic principles: “democratic elec-
tion, democratic decision making, democratic 
management, and democratic oversight”.
How much support does urban grassroots 
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self-government enjoy from China’s urban 
residents? Why do or do not urban residents 
support the self-government system, particu-
larly newly-established CRCs, in their local 
communities? The answers to these questions 
should help us better understand the socio-
political bases of urban self-government and 
hence predict the future of this system and the 
role of such a system in the political develop-
ment of urban China.
1. Defining and Measuring 
Popular Support
To address the first research question of 
how much support the current urban self-
government system enjoys from ordinary 
residents, we first define political support ac-
cording to David Easton’s conceptualization. 
Based on this definition, we then operationlize 
and measure such support among our respon-
dents.
Defining Popular Political Support 
 In studying mass support for the current 
self-government system, we draw mainly on 
Easton’s conceptualization. When defining po-
litical support as a set of attitudes, Easton first 
identifies three major objects toward which 
such support is directed—the regime, the au-
thorities and the political community2. The 
regime, which is usually considered the most 
important object, refers to the fundamental 
values, norms and institutions of the govern-
ment; the authorities incorporate not only the 
incumbent leaders but the political leadership 
in general; the political community denotes 
the group of persons who are bound together 
in a common political enterprise. 
Subsequently, Easton makes a distinction 
between two dimensions—“diffuse support” 
and “specific support”3. Diffuse support repre-
sents a person’s conviction that the existence 
and functioning of the government conform 
2 D. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, 
New York: John Wiley & Son, 1965, Chapters 11-
13.
3 Ibid.
to his or her moral or ethical principles about 
what is right in the political sphere. Of the three 
political objects mentioned above, the regime 
is the primary object of diffuse support. It is 
believed that citizens are linked to the regime 
by diffuse support, which stems from their as-
sessment of the fundamental values, norms 
and institutions of the government. As distinct 
from diffuse support, specific support means a 
person’s satisfaction with specific policies and 
with the performance of the government. Of 
the three political objects, the authorities are 
considered to be the primary object of specific 
support. Citizens are linked to the political au-
thorities through their specific support, which 
derives from their perceptions and evaluations 
of the actual policy outputs of the authorities.
Following Easton’s conceptualization, we 
define mass support for current urban self-
government in this study from two dimen-
sions accordingly—diffuse support for the 
self-government institutions currently imple-
mented in residents’ communities and specific 
support for major policies that are made and 
implemented by the incumbent community 
authorities.
Survey and Sample
The data used in this study came from a 
public opinion survey conducted in five Chi-
nese cities (Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, 
Chengdu, and Hangzhou) in the middle of 
2008. The survey was based on a probability 
sample of the general urban residents of the 
five Chinese cities, aged 18 years and older. 
This probability sample was derived from a 
multistage sampling strategy. Three urban 
districts (qu) were randomly chosen at the 
first sampling stage in each city. At the second 
sampling stage, two streets (jiedao) were ran-
domly selected from the three districts in each 
city, yielding a total of 30 streets. From each 
of the thirty streets, two residents’ communi-
ties were randomly chosen at the third stage 
of sampling, yielding a total of 60 residents’ 
communities in five Chinese cities. Then 2400 
households were randomly chosen from 60 
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residents’ communities. At the final stage, one 
individual was chosen randomly from each of 
the 2400 households as the interviewee. 
College students of political science were 
employed as field interviewers; they were 
trained by project members in field interview-
ing techniques before the actual survey was 
carried out. The technique of face to face in-
terview was used in the survey. Our interview-
ers conducted face to face interview in the re-
spondents’ home, reading the well-designed 
questionnaire in the same manner (ensuring 
reliability). Respondents were offered confi-
dentiality and encouraged to provide answers 
that best captured their true feelings.
Measuring Popular Support for Urban 
Self-Government
Mass political support defined as diffuse 
support for political institutions and specific 
support for government policies has been em-
pirically measured in earlier studies of both 
Chinese and non-Chinese settings4. Diffuse 
4 J. Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban 
China. Stanford University Press and Woodrow 
support for political institutions is typically 
gauged by evaluations of how well, in real-
ity, the system of government upholds basic 
political values and rules in which a person 
believes; whereas specific support for govern-
ment policies is typically gauged by people’s 
evaluations of major policies that are made 
and implemented by the incumbent political 
authority rather than of any specific leaders. 
Based on this empirical measurement tested 
in the earlier studies, we designed our own 
measures of urban residents’ diffuse support 
for the self-government institutions and spe-
cific support for major policies that are made 
and implemented by the incumbent authori-
ties in their communities.
To capture specific support for urban self-
government, we have fashioned four items to 
capture respondents’ evaluations of specific 
policies and their outcomes. These items are 
linked to the following community policy ar-
eas:
 ▪ Maintaining community environment (e.g., 
community security and safety, sanitation, 
Wilson Center Press, 2004.


























1. Maintaining good living 
environment for the whole 
community
 4.5 22.2 11.6 51.3 10.4 3.45 100
2. Taking care of the needy 8.0 21.8 13.5 44.3 12.4 3.32 100 
3. Providing adequate com-
munity service
6.8 21.7 18.6 40.1 12.8 3.34 100 
4. Overall perceptions of the 
CRC policy outcomes and 
performance
8.4 22.5 10.3 42.7 16.1 3.25 100 
NOTE: For each of items in this index, respondents were asked to grade self-government policy performance 
based on the grading scheme commonly used in China’s schools: on a 5-point scale, whereas 1 = very poor; 2 = 
poor; 3 = so-so; 4 = good; and 5 = very good. 
Source: own elaboration.
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and environment)
 ▪ Taking care of the needy
 ▪ Providing adequate community service
The relevance of these policy areas to our 
Beijing samples was assessed in several in-
terview conducted prior to the administra-
tion of formal surveys. The results from these 
pre-survey interviews indicated widespread 
interest among interviewees in each of these 
policy areas. The relevance of the items in this 
index of specific support has been also con-
firmed by some earlier studies on urban self-
government5. The decree which issued by the 
5 A.C. Choate, Local Governance in China, Part 
II: An Assessment of Urban Residents Commit-
tees Municipal Community Development, Asian 
Foundation Working Paper, No. 10, 1998; James 
Derleth and Daniel R. Koldyk, The Shequ Experi-
Ministry of Civil Affair in 2000 also confirms 
the validity of the item in our index of specific 
support. According to the decree, the newly-
established CRCs have to take following tasks: 
providing community service, maintaining 
community sanitation and environment, pro-
tecting community safety, and prospering 
community culture. 
As tab. 1 shows, a little more than 50% of 
our respondents had either positive or very 
positive evaluation of maintaining good liv-
ing environment for the whole community 
(61.7%), taking care of the needy (56.7%), pro-
viding adequate community service (52.9%), 
and overall perceptions of the CRC policy out-
ment: Grassroots Political Reform in Urban Chi-
na, Journal of Contemporary China 13 (2004): 
747-777.


























1. Trust in the Community 
Residents’ Committees 3.8 14.1 8.3 54.1 19.7 3.73 100 
2. The representation of the 
will and interest of commu-
nity residents
2.8 10.8 10.2 48.3 27.9 3.85 100 
3. Assessment of the ad-
ministration of community 
affairs
2.5 17.4 16.3 51.1 12.7 3.54 100 
4. Evaluation of the election 
of leadership in the CRCs 8.0 22.6 11.9 44.3 13.2 3.29 100 
NOTE: Item 1 reads: “Could you tell me how much trust you have in the self-government bodies, the CRC?” 
Respondents were asked to answer this question on a 5-point scale, whereas 1 = none at all; 2 = not very much 
trust; 3 = not quite sure; 4 = quite a lot of trust; and 5 = great deal of trust. Item 2 reads: “To what extent, 
do you think that the self-government bodies, the CRC, can represent the will and interest of community 
residents?” Respondents were asked to answer this question on a 5-point scale, whereas 1 = none at all; 2 = 
not very much; 3 = so-so; 4 = quite a lot; and 5 = great deal. Item 3 reads: “In general, the administration of 
community affairs has been equal and transparent for all residents.” Respondents were asked to assess this 
statement on a 5-point scale, whereas 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = not quite sure; 4 = agree; and 5 
= strongly agree. Item 4 reads: “In general, in the first election of the CRC leaders in my community in 2003, I 
would like to say, it is the residents’ vote that determines the selection of leadership in the CRC.” Respondents 
were asked to assess this statement on a 5-point scale, whereas 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = not 
quite sure; 4 = agree; and 5 = strongly agree. 
Source: own elaboration.
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comes and performance (58.8%). Moreover, 
the mean scores of the four items ranged from 
a low 3.25 to a high 3.45 on a 5-point scale 
where “1” stands for “very negative” and “5” 
refers to “very positive.” In general, there-
fore, the results suggested that the residents’ 
evaluation of major policies that are made and 
implemented by the incumbent CRC authori-
ties was somewhat positive. These four items 
were then combined to form an additive index 
to capture a collective profile of a respondents’ 
specific support for current urban self-govern-
ment.
To capture diffuse support for current self-
government institutions (or system), we asked 
respondents first how much trust they have 
in the newly established urban self-governing 
bodies, the CRCs, and second to evaluate the 
implementation of general self-government 
principles in their own communities. These 
general principles, which are prescribed by 
the decree which issued by the Ministry of 
Civil Affair in 2000, include “democratic elec-
tion, democratic decision making, democratic 
management, and democratic oversight”. Ac-
cording to the decree, these general principles 
are supposed to serve as the cornerstone of 
current urban self-government. To gauge our 
respondents’ assessment of how well the prin-
ciples were implemented in their communi-
ties, we used two items (i.e., item 2, 3, and 4) 
corresponding to these general principles list-
ed above (tab. 2).
As tab. 2 shows, a majority of our respon-
dents had either “positive” or “very positive” 
attitudes toward trust in the newly-established 
CRCs (73.8%), the representation of the will 
and interest of community residents (76.2%), 
assessment of the administration of commu-
nity affairs (63.8%), and evaluation of the elec-
tion of leadership in the CRCs (57.5%). These 
results seem to confirm the argument of some 
recent field reports that people in urban areas 
have increasingly supported the new system of 
urban self-government since the reform of the 
old self-governing bodies, the RCs. The four 
items used in this study to gauge respondents’ 
affect for the self-government system imple-
mented in their communities were combined 
to form an additive index of respondents’ dif-
fuse support for this system.
Furthermore, it should be noted that there 
was a significant disparity between the overall 
evaluation of current self-government institu-
tions implemented in the sample communi-
ties and residents’ evaluation of major policies 
that are made and implemented by the incum-
bent CRC authorities. This disparity can best 
be revealed and summarized by comparing 
the percentage s of the respondents who gave 
positive (including “positive” and “very posi-
tive”) and negative (including “negative” and 
“very negative”) responses to all items in each 
of the two dimensions of political support. As 
Table 3 shows, while only one-fourth (25.8%) 
of our respondents responded positively to 
all four items for the evaluation of policy out-
comes, more than one-third (36.5%) respond-
ed positively to all four items for the evalua-
tion of the implementation of self-government 
institutions in their communities. The same 
table also shows that 12.5% of the sample gave 
Tab. 3. Comparison of Specific Support and Diffuse Support for Urban Self-Gov-
ernment
Level of Support Specific Support%
Diffuse Support
%
“Positive” and “Very Positive” re-
sponses to all four items 25.8 36.5
“Negative” and “Very Negative” 
responses to all four items 12.5 2.5
Source: own elaboration.
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negative responses to all items for the evalu-
ation of policy outcomes, whereas only 2.5% 
gave such responses for the evaluation of the 
self-government institutions. All these results 
clearly indicate that in our sample, a larger 
number of respondents firmly supported the 
self-government institutions implemented in 
their communities, while a smaller number 
of them firmly supported the policy outcomes 
made by the incumbent CRC authorities.
More importantly, however, the results pre-
sented in Table 3 also indicate that, respective-
ly, about 61.7% and 61% of our respondents 
were ambivalent about the policy outcomes 
made by the incumbent CRC authorities and 
their self-government institutions. It is quite 
clear that a sizable majority of people still felt 
ambivalent about both the policy outcomes 
made by the incumbent CRC authorities and 
the self-government institutions. 
2. Explaining Popular Support 
Why do or do not urban residents support 
the self-government system currently imple-
mented in their communities—and the policy 
outcomes made by the incumbent self-govern-
ment authorities? To answer this question, we 
focus on objective social networks and subjec-
tive general trust which exist in an urban com-
munity. Scholars such as Robert Putnam have 
suggested that the existence of objective social 
networks and subjective general trust will con-
tribute to the good governance in a commu-
nity6. 
Measuring General Trust
As Eric Uslaner describes, general trust 
is “trust in people whom we don’t know and 
who are likely to be different from ourselves”7. 
This kind of trust may be also considered as 
“individuals’ estimate of the trustworthiness 
of generalized others, or abstract trust”8. Ac-
cordingly, we measure this kind of indiscrimi-
6 R. Putnam, R. Leonardi, and R. Nanetti, Making 
Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern It-
aly. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.
7 E. Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 
p.15.
8 P. Paxton, Is Social Capital Declining in 
the United States? A Multiple Indicator Assess-
ment, American Journal of Sociology 105 (1999): 
98-99.






Generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted or that you need 
to be very careful in dealing with people? 
1.00 3.00 2.08
Do you think most people would try to take 
advantage of you if they got a chance, or 
would they try to be fair? 
1.87 3.00 2.74
Do you agree that most people, regard-
less of whether known or unknown, can be 
trusted or cannot be trusted?
1.34 3.00 2.26
Objective Networks
Join and participate in non-governmental 
citizen-rights protection groups/activities 
(yes = 1; no = 0).
.03 .34 .028
Join and participate in non-governmental 
charity groups/activities (yes = 1; no = 0).
.04 .45 .041
Source: own elaboration.
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native trust by asking our respondents three 
questions as follows: 
Generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted or that you need to 
be very careful in dealing with people?9
Do you think most people would try to take 
advantage of you if they got a chance or would 
they try to be fair?10
Do you agree that most people, regardless 
of whether known or unknown, can be trusted 
or cannot be trusted?11
As tab. 4 shows, the means of average com-
munity scores for the three items of the subjec-
tive norms of generalized social capital were 
all above the mid point (2 or “50-50 chance”) 
of the 3-point scale, with a low of 2.08 for trust 
vs. caution and a high of 2.74 for being fair vs. 
taking advantage. 
Measuring Social Networks
To operationalize the objective networks of 
generalized social capital, we tap into people’s 
participation in the inclusive (or universal) 
non-governmental organizations or groups. 
Formed among equal members on a volun-
tary base, these organizations/groups are 
what Francis Fukuyama calls “broad radius 
organizations”12, which tend to connect people 
together from different social, economic, oc-
9 Respondents were asked to answer this question 
on a 3-point scale, with 1 indicating “need to be 
very careful,” 2 indicating “either way,” and 3 indi-
cating “most people can be trusted.” This question 
is very similar to the question (i.e. “most people 
can be trusted”), which has been typically asked to 
measure general trust in other survey studies, such 
as the World Value Surveys.
10 Respondents were asked to answer this ques-
tion on a 3-point scale, with 1 indicating “would 
take advantage,” 2 indicating “50-50 chance,” and 
3 indicating “would try to be fair.”
11 Respondents were asked to answer this ques-
tion on a 3-point scale, with 1 indicating “cannot 
be trusted,” 2 indicating “50-50 chance,” and 3 in-
dicating “most people can be trusted.”
12 F. Fukuyama, Social Capital and Development: 
The Coming Agenda, SAIS Review 22 (2002), 
p.34.
cupational, and even political backgrounds13. 
As a result, they tend to be heterogeneous in 
membership and broad in purpose. To mea-
sure participation in this kind of network, 
we asked our respondents whether they ever 
joined in activities of any organizations/
groups of two categories within the past two 
years: non-governmental citizen-rights pro-
tection groups and non-governmental charity 
groups14. Both categories of groups in China 
are more likely to have diverse memberships, 
since the goals of these organizations/groups 
(i.e., citizen rights and charities for all) tend to 
have a strong appeal to people from all walks 
of life15. In our survey, respondents were asked 
to register their responses on a dichotomous, 
0-1 scale, where 0 stands for “didn’t partici-
pate” and 1 refers to “participated.” The means 
of average community scores indicate that 2.8 
% (.028 x 100%) and 4.1 % (.041 x 100%) of re-
spondents participated, respectively, in non-
governmental citizen-rights protection groups 
and in non-governmental charity groups 
across all sampled communities (tab. 4). 
Analytical Results
We expect that both general trust and social 
networks—have a positive impact on the per-
formance of community self-government in-
stitutions in urban China, therefore, leading to 
higher level of popular support for community 
self-government. There are at least two major 
reasons for this expectation. First, in gener-
al, both the general trust and inclusive social 
networks encourage individuals across social, 
economic, and ethnic divides to compromise 
13 See, also, S. Knack, Social Capital and the Qual-
ity of Government: Evidence from the States, 
American Journal of Political Science 46 (2002): 
772-785.
14 E. Uslaner found that there was a strong cor-
relation between generalized trust and charitable 
contribution. See Uslaner, The Moral Foundations 
of Trust, p.133.
15 J. Wang, Y. Yang, and W. Chen, A Report on So-
cio-psychological Research in China in 2006, in 
X. Ru, X. Lu, and P. Li, eds., Analysis and Forecast 
on China’s Social Development, 2007.
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and cooperate16. As Uslaner points out, gener-
al trust “can lead us to civic engagement with 
people who are different from ourselves”17. As 
a result, this kind of general cooperative spirit 
creates a desirable environment for a repre-
sentative government to function effectively 
and responsively.
A second reason is that China’s urban 
neighborhoods have become increasingly di-
verse and their residents have become more 
mobile since the onset of the post-Mao reform. 
With the drastic decline of government-run 
work units—which used to build and/or man-
age their own separate housing units—and 
rapid housing commercialization, as men-
tioned above, the composition of urban neigh-
borhoods has become a function of individual 
choice. Moreover, as China’s urban areas have 
become more cosmopolitan, its urban popu-
lation in general has become increasingly di-
verse socially, culturally and economically, 
and increasingly mobile spatially. In order 
to perform well to satisfy such a diverse and 
ever changing urban population, the CRC as 
the core of the self-government system needs 
effectively to represent the broad interests of 
a diverse population. Since general trust, as 
mentioned above, nurtures government’s re-
sponsiveness to citizens at large rather than to 
narrow interests, a higher level of general trust 
in a community is likely to facilitate better per-
formance of the CRC in that community.
After we conducted a series of bi-corre-
lation analysis, we found that, both general 
trust and participation in inclusive social net-
works—had a significant and positive impact 
on CRCs performance. In other words, as we 
expected, the CRCs in the neighborhoods that 
are endowed with abundant general trust and 
inclusive social networks tend to gain high-
er level of popular support than those in the 
neighborhoods that lack this kind of trust and 
16 F. Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the 
Creation of Prosperity, New York: The Free Press, 
1995.




Overall, both the general trust and inclu-
sive social networks positively affected CRCs’ 
performance, as measured by their respon-
siveness to the interests of residents at large 
and their effectiveness in conducting public 
affairs. Therefore, the CRCs in the neighbor-
hoods that are endowed with abundant gen-
eral trust and inclusive social networks tend 
to gain higher level of popular support than 
those in the neighborhoods that lack this kind 
of trust and social network.
The findings from this study have political 
implications. The performance of community 
self-government such as CRCs in urban areas 
may be significantly improved by increasing 
the right kind of social capital along the two 
dimensions, that is, general trust and social 
networks. Therefore, the central government 
shall take measures to encourage the develop-
ment of various social networks in the com-
munity.
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by Program 
for New Century Excellent Talents in Univer-
sity (NCET-12-0982).
